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Returo to Rhetoric
A Case For Co-operative Discussion
M, SUSAN POWER
Arkansas State University

I
Introduction
Many contemporary students of democracy, normative or empirical,
analyze the concepts of majority rule, equality, and representation. But
Sir Ernest Barker writes in his translation of Aristotle's Politics:

It is thus not an unfair gloss to suggest that Aristotle by implication
assumes that the dialectic of debate is the final foundation of the
principle of popular government, in so far as he accepts that principle. In other words, democracy is based upon discussion. 1
Today the idea that discussion constitutes the primary characteristic of
democracy initially strikes the mind as either paradoxical or misguided.
Many persons think free elections and majority rule are the centr·al features of democracy. However, I wish to explore various views of the
intenelationship between the concepts of decentralized democracies,
modes of discussion, and types of ethical standards . We are seeking to
explicate a correlation between ethical standards, ,decentralized democracies and policy decisions made by means of various discussion processes. In order to simplify the problem, the multiplicity of possible views
have been reduced to two major positions. I have labeled them the modern individualistic and ancient, communal philosophies. Writers supporting both points of view prefer a decentralized democratic governmental
system in contrast to a centralized, bureaucratic or tyrannical system and
challenge their opponents with the assertion that the adoption of their
adversaiies position will produce destruction of freedom, or autocratic,
centralized government. In brief, the modern individualistic group adhers to an ethic of economic or self-interest, decentralized ,democracy and
pa1tisan discussion; whereas the second position, the ancient communalism advocates, value the common good, decentralized democracy and
co-operative discussion. If democracy presupposes discussion, what type
of ethical system best conesponds with it, modern, possessive-individu1 Ernest Barker, The Politics of Aristotle (New York: Oxford University Press,
1962) , p. 126.

1

2

JOURNAL

OF POLITICAL

SCIENCE

alism or some form of a consensual creed in which the common good is
a key principle? In other words, can a decentralized political system work
in which there are no common ethical criteria except econom ic or individual self-interest? Another relate d issue is whether a decentra lized
democratic system best corresponds with a communal-consensual ethical
system in which policy decisions are made by means of co-operative discussion or with a system in which decisions are a balance of self-interest.
More specifically, in order to discuss these problems in greater de tail in
this essay I have chosen to contras t some classical theorists wit h a few
advocates of modern possessive indivi du alism. 2 First, the case tha t partisan discussion and individualism b est correspond with decentra lized
democracy is stated. Then the posi tion of the proponents of coopera tive
discussion is summarized. In conclusion, I present and defen d the th esis
that cooperative discussion along the lines advocated by the classical
Greek theorists most adequately corresponds with decentralize d democratic government.

II
Modern Indivi dualism
Modern individualism is a maj or economic and political tra dition.
Some insist that its roots are found in Adam Smith's Wealt h of N ations,
an d Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan. 3 In "Margina l Notes on Reading Political Philosophy," James M. Buchanan says philosophical indivi du alism
which he associates with Hume, Locke and Kant, bases politica l obligation on self-interest and conventional rules of conduct. Here, indivi du als
make decisions and the state derives from rational calculations of selfinterest .4 In America John C. Calhoun and William Graham Sum ner
expoun ded varieties of this philosophy. Two recent works within this
tradition, Anthony D own's An Economic Theory of Democracy ,and
2 C. B. McPherson, The Political Theory af Possessive Individualism: Hobbes
To Locke (London: Oxford University Press, 1962) p. 273 . McPherson reduces
the liberal-individualist tradition to seven assumptions. He recognizes that within an
individualistically based society there is a serious problem with maintenance of social
cohesion. "The further condition is that there be a cohesion of self-interests, among
all those who have a voice in choosing the government, sufficient to offset centrifug al
forces of a possessive market society. This constitution was fulfilled, in the heyday of
the market society, by the fact that a political voice was restricted to a possessing class
which had sufficient cohesion to decide periodically , without an archy, who should
have the sovereign power . As long as this condition was fulfilled there was a sufficient
basis for an autonomous theory of obligation of the individual to a constitutional liberal state."
3 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy ( New York; Harpe r and
Row, 1957), p. 27.
4 James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of
Michigan , 1965), pp . 314, 3 15, 316 .
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Charles Lindblom's The Intelligence of Democracy will be considered
here.
Anthony Downs asks what motivates men to pursue political careers
and what constitutes rational political decisions. Rationality and realism
require that one make the assumption men pursue their own interest in
order to obtain income, prestige and power. 5 Only individuals have ends/
goals, and there is no such tibing as a common good or general welfare for
the community. 6 Yet, Downs asserts communal consensus or some form
of conventional standards are necessary. The problem emerges of how
they ,are to be fo1mulated given the prior assertion of the non-existence of
a common good. According to Downs a stable democracy cannot exist
without extensive ideological consensus. A democratic government would
not be effective in a conflict ridden community divided into two equal
camps because this would produce stalemate. He thinks democracy both
presupposes and requires consensus about goals but not perfect agreement. 7 Thus Downs thinks the self-interested individual must seek satisfaction within the ethical constraints imposed by conventional, consensual norms or the Judeo-Christian morality. The problem of how serious
differences over such issues ,as, for example, state funding of birth control
measures would be handled, is not resolved. In other words, this individual consent model is only viable with the assumption added that policy
decisions are con£ned within the boundaries of conventional Chiistianity
and not extended to those controversial areas which divide Chiistians.
Charles Lindblom's contributions to this tradition are of major significance. His ethical position closely resembles Jeremy Bentham's utilitarian calculus. According to Lindblom, individuals have different, often
5 Ibid., pp. 4, 28. Cf. James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Political Ethos
Revisited ." American Political Science Review, LXV (December, 1971), pp. 10481062. Wilson and Banfield identify two opinion groups in contemporary American
which they call "holists" and "localists." The holist view is said to be associated with
middle-class Anglo Saxon Protestant origins whereas the other view is combined
with an immigrant, working-class ethos. The unitarist view stresses community service, the public interest, honesty, obligation to assume civic responsibilities and impartiality in law enforcement . The localists favor people-helping items, increases
in welfare payments and people-h elping conceptions as the primary function of a
governmental system.
6 Ibid., pp. 289, 15. Cf. Murray Eldleman, Politics As Symbolic Action: Mass
Arousal and Quiescence ( Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 46, 69,
81, 51, Eldleman presents an individualistic-psychological interpretation of the role
that political discussion performs in a democratice society, According to his view, discussion helps deviates to accept policy defe cts, and opponents to adjust to disliked
decisions. Political speeches appeal to deep-seated anxieties impulses, fears, needs,
desires and urges. "It appears that those who can be expected to benefit substantially
in status or money from belief in a myth are especially susceptible; they are inclined
to translate their interests in status and money into the terms of a myth that defines
their behavior as serving the public interest,"
7 Ibid ., pp. 114, 162.
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conflicting, values which are not equal. "Good" political decisions require
clarification of stable key values and involve difficult serious thought
about how values are linked with perferred public policy decisions. The
formulation of "well-considered" values requires leadership. 8 Values can
also be collective, and widely shared, in contrast with private particular
values. He ,asserts that it is impossible to formulate an aggregate definition of the public interest. 9
Universal or general political criteria such as majority preference or
equality are inadequate or ,ambiguous and of no help in solving complex
problems of public policy formulation. He does recognize the existence
of what Lindblom calls conventions and the rules of the game.
It might be suggested, then, that the overwhelming commitme nt to
democracy of, say, American citizens takes the form of verbal commitment to loose and abstract principles that are quite inadeq uate
for application, and of habits of political behavior that proximate ly
support democratic government. Given the habits repression is at a
minimum, and government is consented to even in the absence of
consensus on less loose and abstr,act principles. 10
In this situation where no really useful common standards of ethics exist,
the partisan is one who makes decisions calculated to serve his own good
or his definition of the public interest. According to Lindblom:
... there are no bedrock social preferences or social values; every
value held is a product of and is continuously reconsidered in the
light of existing circumstances, especially those that bear on the
probability of our satisfying our preferences.11
Since individuals have interests which conflict and since there are no
generally accepted criteria, guidelines, general ethical principles or rules,
co-ordination should be achieved by means of "mutual partisan adjustment" rather than by force . Any common values are created in this government by consent. Lindblom concludes that the only other alternati ves
for the achievement of agreement, a social-political contract having been
omitted , would be either central direction or a non-democratic government. The co-operative discussion process model with its shared common
value system or code, he thinks, necessarily requires a chief co-ordina tor,
or a highly centralized, non-democratic, administrative state. Among the
8 Charles Lindblom, The Intelligence Of Democracy: Decision-Making Through
Mutual Adjustment (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 270.
o Ibid., pp . 277, 283, 286, 287.
10 Ibid., p. 263.
11 Ibid., p. 209.
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many devices be considers to attain a public decision in the face of conflicting interests and views are negotiation, bargaining and partisan discussion. Negotiation, Lindblom says, includes appeals, threats and promises. Discussion involves a reappraisal of partisan interests and the means
to satisfy them. ·Partisan mutual adjustment arises when no common values can be formulated for testing public policies .12 Partisan discussion is
defined as:
... A form of partisan mutual adjustment in which X, as a recognized
condition of making his own decision effective, induces a response
from Y by effecting through communications a reappraisal by Y of
his partisan interests and the means to satisfy those without X's actually altering the objective consequences for Y of any of his possibl,e
responses, where Y may or may not, in a symmetrical relation, do the
same with respect to X.18
partisan mutual adjustment by means of discussion promotes agreement
on values by modification elimination and creation of values so that conflict between them can be replaced by co-ordination, consent and agreement. According to Lindblom, this process involves weighing diHerent
values against each other, appropriately sacrificing amounts of some values to others and recognizing that not all values are equal. 14 Values are
counted differently according to the authority or position held by the
participants, and they alter from situation to situation. The more widely
shared a value, interest or preference, the heavier its weight in partisan
adjustment. In addition, Lindblom thinks the intensity with which a
value is held by an individual is added to this calculus. 15 Decisions
reached this way promote stability agreement, action, democratic decentralization and moderation
The defects of co-operative discussion Lindblom mentions are that
it requires a centralized co-ordinator and it assumes that people wholly
accept and do not resist the centralist's decisions when discussion fails.
According to Lindblom, paralysis in political decision-making ensues if
one attempts to reach agreement on p1ior values rather than on specific
policy statements whereas specific policy decisions can be achieved with
general consent even if people differ on general value standards. Co-operative discussions are muddy and leave values poorly understood, illdefined, and abstract. It produces rigidity in thinking which precludes
shifting or abandoning values, and the variety of appeals is limited. The
12 Ibid.,
18 Ibid.,
14 Ibid.,
111Ibid.,

pp. 55, 74, 263.
p. 71. Italics in original.
pp. 207, 244.
pp. 227, 235, 237, 240, 242, 244.
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group is paralyzed until it finds values on which it is willing to declare
its agreement. 16
The modem individualist tradition starting from the realistic pr emise
that men are motivated in their political actions and decisions by the
pursuit of self-interest draws the conclusion that there is no such entity
as a common good. However, recognizing some need for sufficient agreement to make collective action possible, ,all of the theorists here considered suggest such devices unanimity, weak consensus about democracy,
support for the rules of the game, and also conventional supp ort for the
basic principles of the Judeo-Christian religions. Lindblom suggests th e
utilization of what he calls partisan mutual adjustment and discussion
where no common values exists as a basis for public policies. Lindblom's
model, in view of his ,acceptance of the proposition of a society with no
common values, is a brilliant effort to provide some workable solution to
the very serious problem of how such a society is to provide for any
public policy without resorting to coercive governmental implementation
of policies upon individuals whose values may differ sharply . The empirical problem of whether any society or government actually exists where
there are no common values, no consensus or convention is ,another issue.
But, let us now tum to the case presented by the ancient communa lists.

III
Ancient Commu nalism
In the ancient Greek polis, political oratory flourished, decisions in
the assemb ly flowed from public discussions, and the art of verba l communication developed from a skill to an art and then was formulated
by Aristotle into a science. Perhaps the Greeks were so interes ted in the
art of decision-making by discussion precisely because the ir political
system originated prior to the invention of the printing press an d the
computer. My analysis of ancient communalism starts with a brief consideration of Plato's Gorgias and Phaedrus as representative of th e cooperative discussion position . This study of the ancients also includes
parts of Plato's Republic ,and Aristotle's Rhetoric. Despite the important
philosophic differences between Plato and Aristotle on many issues, here
I consider them as mutual participants in a continuously developing tradition . From this prospective Aristotle's Rhetoric is viewed as establishing a "science" to replace the abuses of the Sophists stresse d by Plato.
This "new science" was first suggested as an intellectua l pro ject ,by Plato
in the Phaedrus. Plato's Republic provide s us with a symbolic model of
16

Ibid., pp. 108, 140, 220, 221, 222.
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the ideal discussion process. I conclude this section with a summary of
the essential propositions in the ancient communal model which assumes
the existence of a common good and prefers the co-operative discussion
process.
In Plato's Gorgias we find the fust philosophic investigation of rhetoric . It is defined ,as "the ability to persuade with words judges in law
courts , senators in the Senate, assembly men in the Assembly, and men
in any other meeting which convenes for the public interests." 17 Whereas
the philosopher is concerned with dialectic, logic and discussion, the
student of rhetoric investigates the art of persuasion. 18 The good teacher
of rhetoric need not be a Sophist, according to Plato. A true rhetorician
must fust be a just man who seeks the common good rather than bis own
privat e interest. The man who teaches only with a view to promoting his
own self-interest and without regard for the truth does not serve the welfare of the community. The primary responsibility of the statesman is the
improvement of his fellow citizens without toadying to their lowest desires. Teachers ,of rhetoric should realize that discussions need to be conducted without destroying the bonds of friendship which are necessary
in ord er to maintain communal cohesion and order. According to •Plato,
the cosmos, heaven, and earth are held together by the virtue of sharing,
by friendship , self-control and justice. 19 Political discussants should remember that these important ends place limits upon verbal exchanges.
In the Phaedrus, Plato claims that any adequate science of rhetoric
must fust be concerned with the analysis of the soul or psychology. One
should investigate what kinds of discussion affect which types of personality and why persuasion works with some persons and not with
others. He dismisses other contemporary studies of rhetoric as defective
becau se they are not in his estimation "scientific." The student of rhetoric
should proc eed to try out his theories by testing them against his sense
experiences. Plato outlines high standards to be met ,by any future student of rhetoric.
But it is only wh en he can state adequately what sort of man is persuad ed by what sort of speech; when he has the capacity to decl are
hims elf ,with complete perception, in the presence of another , that
h ere is th e man and here the nature that was discussed theoretically
at school-here, now, present to him in actuality-to which be must
apply this kind of speech in this sort of manner in order to obtain
17

p.10.
18
19

Plato's Gorgias, trans. W. C. Helmbold (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1952),

Jbid, p. 24.
Ibid., p. 83.
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persuasion for this kind of activity-it is only when he can do all
this and when he has, in ,addition , grasped the concept of pro pr iety
of time-when to speak and when to hold his tongue , when to use
and when not to use brachylogy, in a word, each of the specific devices of discourse he may have studied-it is only then .and not until
then that the finishing and perfecting touches will have been given
to his science. 20
Socrates and his friends in The Republic state what I take to be
Plato's answer to the evil of sophistry . Socratic dialectical discussion is
proposed as the ideal mode for philosophic and political inquiry. Wha t,
briefly, is philosophic discussion, what is the dialetical method , who can
participate in discussion , what ,are the prerequisites for philosophic discussion? Discussion requires adherence to basic logical rules in order to
construct good definitions and to provide a common understanding of the
terms used. This, Plato thinks, is a necessary preliminary step in the construction of an argument or case. To learn to discuss is a difficult thing, a
skill or art which involves comprehending your fellow participant's position prior to attempting its refutation. One has first to listen and understand.21 Unexpressed common assumptions need to be made explicit. 22 When the participants reach ,agreement, the discussion may th en
proceed forward. Psychological attitudes are important. If one is not
capable of discussion without extreme anger or emotional disturbance,
he is not fit for or able to discuss philosophical questions fruitfully. One
must not assume he knows all of the answers •before the discussion b egins; discussion is not a trick game of sophomores refuting each oth er.
Plato writes one must be a mature adult with a balanced personality,
sufficient interest and a mind open to reason. 23 Interpersonal agreeme nt
between discussants is a means of checking the truthfulness of the definition , which should also meet tests of universality ,and logical consistency.24 Maturity, wisdom, intelligence, fairness, honesty, temperanc e,
moderation and courage are qualities needed to be a good discussant.
Questions must be put fairly, no possible answers should be eliminated
before the pursuit is begun, one agrees only if he honestly agrees . If a
discussant changes his mind in the course of a discussion, he should point
20Plato's Phaedrus, trans. by W . C. Helmbold and W. C. Rabinowitz ( New
York: Liberal Arts Press, 1956) , p. 64.
2 1 Plato, The Republic of Plato, trans. by Allan Bloom ( New York, Basic Books,
1968).
22Ibid., 335b.
2sIbid., 539d.
24Ibid., 336e.
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this out to the others. 25 One should eliminate abusive personal attacks,
speech should be prec~se, and a serious inte~t shoul~ motivate. him f~r
"what we seek is genU1Deagreement concermng the nnportant issues m
life." 26 Discussion also requires the right kind of emotive environment:
a mood of extreme hostility between disputants impedes interchange between truth-seekers. A friendly, trusting, receptive sympathetic audience
is best. 27
According to Plato there are important differences between a debate
and a philosophic discussion.

" ow,'' I said, "if we should speak at length against him, setting
speech against speech, telling how many good things belong to being just and then he should speak in return, and we again, there'll
be need of counting the good things and measuring how many each
of us has in each speech, and then we'll be in need of some sort of
judges who will decide. But if we consider just as we did a moment
ago, coming to agreement with one another we'll ourselves be both
judges and pleaders at once." 28
In the discussion process one seeks the consent of other persons. Here the
discussants combine the functions of advocate and judge and proceed by
asking questions, discussing problems and reaching agreement on first
points before proceeding to the second. Superficial, compact answers or
slogans are not acceptable. One looks deeper into issues, knows, elaborates and discusses premises, draws accurate conclusions from premises,
rejects absurd conclusions and defective, deficient definitions and
searches for the most universal definition. 29
In summary, Plato establishes the points that discussion is different
from debate, that it has prerequisites and rules, that it begins with proper
definitions of terms and that it requires a certain personality type. A
final conclusion he reaches is that the restoration of the art of philosophic
discussion is an essential plank in his reform program for Greek democracy. Plato vigorously criticizes the typical meeting of the democratic
assembly. He suggests several ways to improve public discussion with
the hope that division, discord, disunity and hostility would be replaced
by friendly agreement upon wise solutions to difficult problems produced after extensive consideration.
25

26
21
28
29

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

337b, 339b, 340c, 342d.
350e, 351a, 350d.
450d, 451a, b.
348a.
368.
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'When," I said, "many gathered together sit down in assemblies
courts, theaters, army camps , or any other common meeting of th;
multitude, and with a great deal of uproar , blame some of the things
said or done, and praise others , both in excess, shouting and clapping; and besides, the rocks and the very place surrounding them
echo and redouble the uproar of blame and praise." 80
A government in which decisions are reached by reasoned discussion requires that persons determined to rule by persuasion rather than by
force predominate in the community. They should possess the requis ite
abilities and skills to rule by means of discussion. In Book Eight Plato
concludes that rule by reason is not possible where untrained per sons
predominate, which he assumes would be the case in a direct participatory democracy. He has set his standards for philosophic discussion so
high that its achievement would require a regime controlled by specially educated philosopher kings. Plato saw a relationship between the
spread of sophistry and the decline of the polis and proposed the teac hing of skills in philosophic discussion as a restorative measure. Howe ver,
philosopher kings are different from political orators and disputants in
the rough and tumble every day decision-making about public policy .
Aristotle reshapes philosophical discussion into an instrument more
suited to the realities of politics. Political science should include a careful study of the art of verbal persuasion because it is the major mea ns
utilized by the politician to gain his ends. So the Rhetoric, often neglected by political theorists, is the necessary companion volume to the
Politics and the Ethics. In the Rhetoric Aristotle asks; if rational speech
is more distinctive of man than the use of physical force, should he be
more ashamed of himself if he cannot defend himself with speech than
if he fails to defend himself with arms? 81 It is the art of public speaking,
concerned with the methods of persuasion and demonstration, which
teaches a man how to influence the decisions of the lawgivers, the members of assemblies and juries. According to Aristotle , there are three
major areas of persuasion; first, by means of influence of the speaker's
personal character; second, by manipulation of the listener's emotions;
and third, by means of the content of a speech where the truth is pr oven
by means of argument. 32 Both ethical and rhetorical studies are related
to political science, and are different from the dialectical argumenta tion
utilized by philosophers.
so Ibid ., 492c.
Aristotle: Rhetoric, trans . by W. Rhuys Roberts and Poetics, trans. by Ingram
Bywater (New York: Modem Library , 1954), 1355b.
82 Ibid., 135 6a-b.
81
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The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate
upon without arts, or systems to guide us, in the hearing of persons
who cannot take in at a glance a complicated argument, or follow a
long chain of reasoning. Tihe subjects of our deliberation are such
as seem to present us with alternative possibilities; about things
that could not have been, and cannot now or in the future be, other
than they are, nobody who takes them to be of this nature wastes his
time in deliberation. 83
The orator is concerned with things to be done in the future and
urges people either to do or not to do something. Political speeches,
therefore, aim at proving either the expediency or good, or the harmfulness or evil, of actions. 34 Just and good deeds are actions done for the
sake of others or for one's benefactors. 85
Aristotle speculates that 11hetoricis a combination of the science of
logic and political ethics with a dash of sophistical reasoning added for
spice. There are five main subject areas for political speakers. These are
ways and means, war and peace, national defense, imports and exports,
and legislation. 36 According to him, assertive, self-seeking makes friendship difficult if not impossible. Aristotle writes that in his estimation the
political speaker's aim is utility, to determine not ends but the means to
ends, i.e., what it is useful to do. In politics, he thinks, goodness and
utility are synonymous.
In Book I of the Rhetoric Aristotle systematically relates the omtor's
art to other areas of knowledge. The projected model of the skilled political leader is very different from either the philosopher king, the statesman, or the Chicago boss. He is preeminently a man of experience, reason and practicality. Yet he also retains his nobility and humor. Here the
role of political science is educational since the most important and effective qualification for successful persuasion is to be well-informed
about different governmental systems. In addition, the politician needs
to understand what other people's interests are since this is a key to inducing them to formulate favorable decisions. 87 The study of social ethics
assists him by lending information by means of which he can direct his
appeals to the particular moral characteristics of different cultures.
In Book II of the Rhetoric, Aristotle aims to teach an aspiring leader
how to influence a group to make decisions he thinks best. The three keys
33
84
85
86
37

Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Jbid.,
Ibid .,
Ibid .,

1357c.
1359.
1366-1367a.
1362a.
1365-1366.
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to success in this project are good sense, good moral character and good
will .38 An additional subject matter to be mastered is psychology -the
analysis of the human motivational-emotional structure, or knowle dge of
the soul. The remainder of this book contains his analysis of the logical
elements involved in political discussions, which are muoh too complex
for detailed consideration here. 89 In general Aristotle says that all effective arguments are founded upon an adequate knowledge of the facts
and the subject-matter.
In summary, I would like to re-formulate ancient communalism into
five propositions. First, civic virtue and public standards for policy decisions are to be based upon rational consideration of group interes t and
the common good which is assumed to exist. Second, political leade rship
should be by means of rational peaceful discussion which assumes some
qualifications , ability and training in the art and science of rhetoric, an
important division of political science. Third, a healthy state of co-operative discussion is said to be vitally necessary for the continue d wellbeing of the polis. Discussions must be conducted without dest roying
the bonds of friendship. Excessive vituperation, bitterness an d pe rsonalized attacks are beyond the limits of permissible modes of discussion.
Assertive self-seeking destroys friendship and hence tends to un dermine
the unity necessary to a polis. Fourth, the ancient authors knew the effects of partisan discussion or sophistry but asserted that it prn du ced
bad results, destructive of the public interest and disruptive of and destructive of unity. And, filth, they recognized the existence of dishonorable ,dishonest politicians who pandered ,to the lowest interests of the
public in order to promote their own self-interest.

IV
Conclusion
A striking contrast in political theories now confronts us. The ancient
model presupposed strong bonds of societal friendship with skilled discussants co-operatively devising resolutions for public differences in accord with a common good; whereas the modem-individualistic model assumes a group of self-interested individuals who recognize no common
ethical standards trading off individual assets in order to forge an acceptable solution. Yet there are some common assumptions in the two
positions despite the manifest differences. For example, both models
recognize that some method of resolving disagreements about policy is
asIbid ., 1378.
soIbid., 1391-2.
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needed. Both presuppose that men even with the best of intentions and
even granted widely accepted ethical standards will not always agree
about what policy would, in this specific case, best promote the welfare
of the community . Secondly, both models exhibit a preference for decentralized government ,and rationally derived policy decisions. In addition there is the assertion that abstract definitions of majority rnle and
equality are of ve1y little utility in devising specific policies. There are
vaiying degrees of admission among the writers studied above that political systems operate within the oontext of social convention or within
the limitations, as in America, of religious standards . The last assumption
held in common by these theorists is that highly centralized , administrative states require a single co-ordinator. This, it is claimed, results in
irrational , rigid decisions potentially destructive of freedom because such
a system would be beyond the intellectual oapacities of one man. Coordinated, rational planning in the highly centralized, administrative
state is a myth.
The most important areas of disagreement may be formulated into
the following series of propositions:

1. The standards found in a society's religion and constitutional morality do not provide any operational basis for making specific policy decisions. The only possible standard is individual self-interest;
2. It is possible to formulate a political model in which no general
ethics are posited since there are no useful common standards applicable to policy decisions;
3. Decisions and values have to be created by politicians in a negotiated trnde;
4. Co-operative discussion is not the preferred method of reaching
decisions; and
5. Co-operative discussion within the context of a society in which
agreement about some fundamental ethics exists cannot co-exist
with either decentralized or free government
A fundamental axiom of the co-operative-ancient position is that
the primary obligation of the politician is the pursuit of the common interest. To say that most men are motivated only by the desire to secure
power , money and prestige may be tantamount to asserting that, from
another moral perspective, all politicians are evil . This pessimistic assumption would preclude the possibility of any statesmen providing
virtuous leadership for a society. The classical view that civic viltue derives from dedication to the common good, that disinterested service to
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the community is noble and statesman-like, and that some men ,are capa•ble of self-sacrifice, hence, political virtue seems a better position .
In addition , excessive promotion of self-interest undermines unity
and retards the process of reaching decisions. Aristotle insists that promotion of individualistic int erests d estroys societal dispersion of friendship. The totally self-interested public man would become bogged down
in endless negotiations to construct a winning coalition in the assembly
or cabinet. One envisions much time wasted , endless delays and stalemates , and insufficient agreement to expedite the public business . After,
all, why should I compromise or h·ade away any portion of my own individual self-interest in order to further co-operation and ,advancement of
public policy? Stalemate would result because it is difficult to imagine a
situation in which a continuous series of decisions could be mutu ally
beneficial to the perceived self-interests of the individuals participa ting
in the bargains.
Turning to the second area of disagreement , the projection of an
operational governmental mod el in which no general standards exist, the
pressing question is: Could any political system work in which there are
no ethical criteria except economic or individual self-inter est? Perhaps
such a system might function , but not , in my estimation, withou t some
application of force because there would not be sufficient volunta1y support for its use in the community . Why, for example , should I, John Doe,
be obligated to support and pay for X policy made by a group of selfinterested administrators in order to promote their self-interests? What
standards would be utilized in reaching a prior agreement abou t how
to make decisions, ,and how would one preclude endless debate over how
things are going to be decided in a partciular case. If politicians are to
discuss endlessly and to make bargains or h·ades promoting their selfinterest and in the process to create "ethical standards," then it ,app ears
to me that the model government would grind to a halt.
Another problem with the "no general standards" model concern&
the ethical basis for majority rule as a decision-making device in elections, ,a legislature or an administrative bureau. For how can one rema in
a unique person with radically individualistic interests and rea lly different ethical principles , and also simultaneously be a part of a majority
committed to obey the laws of the land? Surely paralysis would -again
result simply because ( especially where the rule of unanimity is applied
as the only logical solution to the above dilemma) few or no decisions
supported by a majority could ever be made.
In addition, public discussion in a legislature or cabinet may be an
essentially different process from that involved in making economi c deals
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in which the victory goes to the strongest coalition of sel£sh interests.
Many public policy issues might involve problems that do not relate to
"interest," a concept which is rather ill-defined and ambiguous. The discussion process as prescribed by Plato and Aristotle involving men thinking together in order to come up with ,adequate answers to pressing public problems is the alternative which leaves room for the possibility of
decisions based upon pursuit of the common good or justice . All might
be said to have an equal stake in working closely and co-operatively together in an atmosphere of friendship in an effort to discover the best
possible solutions. This model requires some leaders of intellectual and
moral stature who assist in the application and explication of the communities appropriate moral standards. In other words, the moral rubric
thou shalt not steal is not automatically self-enforcing nor is it a simple
matter to apply in a criminal legal code for a complex industralized society. But, what modem society could continue to function without an
elaborate mechanism enforcing the simple maxim?
The third proposition in dispute raises serious problems for a democratic society. The ancient-communalist accepted the idea of the godlike lawgiver, a Solon or Moses, who formulated their primary moral
laws. Hence is brought into question the role of the politician as the creator of values. Two points are at stake: the extent of participation by
other societal members in devising general mores or ethics if the community is to be democratic and decentaralized; and the specific problem
of relegating the function of value creation to politicians. It would appear ithat the modern-individualistic model blurs the distinctions between the philosopher-scholar, the churchman-eithicist and the statesmanpolitician. Too great a responsibility is placed upon the average politician when one .asks him to create values by means of deals in the process
of trying to work out suitable compromises for the polis. Moreover, ethical standards or rules of some so1t may be needed at all stages of the
policy formulation process and may well be a prerequisite for peaceful
mutual negoti-ations.
Paradoxically, there is a recognition of the need for a statement of
ethical standards to guide the politician's specific policy formulations.
In a democratic society these rules should emerge from the hearts of the
people, from the souls of those with religious convictions, and from the
minds of the philosophers. Surely the politician should be in the business of performing the complex task of taking these standards and demands .and formulating the specific details of public policy, of suggest ing means, not ends, as Aristotle suggests. If the politicians -create values
and attempt to impose policies upon a community in which no concen-
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sus about their validity exists, then coercion might be required to enforce these laws.
The merits of co-operative discussion are legion . It holds forth the
possibility of reducing violent and hateful, interpersonal exchanges
about controversial ideals and policies. Indeed, if agreement cannot be
reached without provoking excessive anger, one would assume that the
wise political decision is to stop pressing that issue, and not take any
action until peaceful, rational discussion becomes possible. I would urge
the utilitaiian consideration that one should not waste time discussing
policies that will be violently opposed or received very little support .
Co-operative discussion does not create paralysis, irrationality, abstract ness; rather it may clear the way for a more realistic estimation of the
possible within the limitations imposed in the given context and promote
peaceful, friendly, serious consideration of what constitutes good public
policy. Disunity and division might be reduced, and persuasion given
more chance to prevail over coercion, threat or force. The role of the
politician might be reduced to formulating means to achieve agreed
upon ends, leaving the realm of ethics to the philosopher, the theorist,
the humanist and the churchman. Intelligent public policy might then
be devised by politicians, nay statesmen.
And fifth, the assumption that co-operative discussion requires a
centralized state needs to be challenged. Is there not an alternative which
might prove to be more desirable than either the radical individualistic
or the iigidly collectivistic models? Quite clearly the closed, compact
commun~ties of ancient Greece are a thing of the past. The Puiitan effort
to create Christian commonwealthes in a new land floundered upon the
rocks of religious discord and pluralism. Yet the medieval Christian community was highly localistic, and the Greek city-state was decentralize d.
Aristotle in the Politics presents examples of a variety of small systems.
In the pre-modem era there was a plethora of decentralized systems,
parochial, viable, local communities. Surely, members of a strong, local
community who are wrestling with disputed matters of public policy
have a better possibility of reaching a solution acceptable to the majority of citizens than does a central administrator attempting the impossible task of formulating a uniform policy for a society full of diverge nt
interests and views. The co-operative discussion process should work
best in a decentralized system where some agreement concerning the
common interest still exists. To the contrary one wonders if any serious
discussion is possible in or promoted by highly centralized governmen ts
in large countries? The conclusion is reached that co-operative discus-
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sion and viable concepts of the general interest are most likely to exist
in a decentralized system and, therefore, this model does not correspond
with a centralized, administrative governmental system.
And last , we reconsider the point with which this essay began, the
correlation between democracy and discussion . At issue is what kind of
discussion process most closely -corresponds with a democratic decisionmaking process. It has been assumed that there is an inter-relationship
between the way decisions are reached and reasonable, democratic government. Unfortunately democmtic theories which emphasize majority
rule as its typical characteristic tend to end up talking about numbers
and counting. The assumption follows that x is the democratic decision
simply because more or at least fifty percent plus one of the participants
support it. In the last analysis this type of majority rule is reduced to the
claim one is obligated to support the rnles of tlie majority because there
are more of them and they are stronger than we are . The majority is
right because it is more numerous. Both the partisan-individualistic and
ancient-communalistic models are an essentially different approach to
democratic theory. They stress the importance of making decisions by
peaceful means in which decisions are authorized because they result
from a process which is rational. The merit of the individualistic model
is that it points to a calculated effort to play off considemtions of economic and individual self-interest in a bargaining process. The ancientcommunalistic model emphasizes adjusting different opinions about what
policy best promotes the common interest. The point these theorists make
is that by means of protracted fruitful consultations about alternative
ideas, the majority has been convinced that their preferences best correspond with a public good . Therefore, in a situation where disagreements arise over choices, all are obligated to support ,the decision of the
majority because more of them think that this policy is for the good of all.

